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Persuading in-group deviants to become normative may carry costs that outweigh the
advantages of group consensus. This study investigates the effects of potential cost,
normative support, and issue importance on group members’ efforts to change the
views of in-group deviants (N  115). In line with previous research into bystander
intervention, the authors show that when costs are low, high levels of either importance
or normative support are sufficient to increase persuasion action tendency. When costs
are higher, higher levels of both issue importance and normative support are necessary
to increase persuasion action tendency. In addition, content analysis of messages sent
to in-group deviants show that high potential costs and low levels of issue importance
reduce the proportion of messages sent that are persuasive. These results are discussed
in terms of theories of approach/avoidance and social identity.
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Deviant in-group members are those whose
conduct departs from the behavioral and attitu-
dinal norms of the in-group (Marques & Yzer-
byt, 1988). Deviant in-group members some-
times evoke strong reactions, including negative
evaluations and derogation by other group
members (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, &
Henson, 2000; Begue, 2001; Branscombe,
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Marques,
Abrams, & Seroˆdio, 2001; Marques, Yzerbyt, &
Leyens, 1988). However, research on responses
to in-group deviance in intergroup contexts has
not yet investigated the necessary and sufficient
conditions to motivate different action tenden-
cies (see Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000)
among other in-group members. These include
reaffirming in-group norms (Hutchison,
Abrams, Gutierrez, & Viki, 2008), avoiding de-
viants, changing their opinions, or demanding
that they leave the group (see also Eidelman,
Silvia, & Biernat, 2006; Pinto, 2006).
Group members may be motivated to ensure
deviants become normative in some situations
only (e.g., Evans, 2001; Horne & Cutlip, 2002).
They may also be willing to interact with devi-
ants (Marques et al., 2001). How and when
group members pursue different behaviors
(such as persuasion or avoidance) is at present
unknown. Research into small group processes
provides some insights. For instance, Schachter
(1951) showed that deviant group members were
more likely to be assigned unattractive jobs and
received seven times as much communication
from normative members than other members did.
Unfortunately, the content of the communications
between normative and deviant group members in
Schachter’s study was not analyzed, so conclu-
sions cannot be drawn about whether deviants
were being persuaded, punished, or even con-
doned for their behavior. Nor did this study ma-
nipulate variables that may change the preference
for different action tendencies.
The present article applies Piliavin, Dovidio,
Gaertner, and Clark (1981) arousal: cost reward
model (A:CR) of helping behavior to the do-
main of in-group deviance. This allows predic-
tions of when group members will choose when
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to persuade in-group deviants and when they
will not. The A:CR model posits that arousal
caused by another’s distress, provided it is not
misattributed to another source, prompts a de-
cision to be made as whether to help in a situ-
ation. It is assumed that as arousal increases it
becomes more unpleasant, and pressure to de-
crease it heightens. Arousal can be reduced
through a variety of means including direct in-
tervention, cognitively reframing the situation,
or simple denial. Provided no special circum-
stances are present that evoke immediate action,
the decision as to whether or not to intervene
directly is made on the basis of a cost calcula-
tion. There are two forms of cost, which the
present article terms “inhibitor” and “enablers.”
Inhibitors reduce the tendency to act by high-
lighting costs of action (such as effort, loss of
time or opportunity, and various risks to self), or
reducing the perceived benefits of acting (see
Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975; Piliavin &
Piliavin, 1972). Enablers increase the likeli-
hood of acting by highlighting potential benefits
of acting or, alternatively, the costs of failing to
act (e.g., unpleasant empathetic arousal, loss of
rewards, damage to personal reputation, self-
blame, and remorse). Levels of both inhibitors
and enablers can occur in four possible combi-
nations (high inhibitor-low enabler, high inhib-
itor-high enabler, low inhibitor-high enabler,
low inhibitor-low enabler). The A:CR model
makes predictions as to what type of response
will occur in each of these contexts by assuming
that individuals seek to reduce arousal while
incurring the lowest net costs. Thus, if levels of
inhibitors are low, and those of enablers are
high (e.g., the cost of not acting outweighs the
cost of acting), then direct intervention is pre-
dicted. In this situation there are no barriers to
action, and high motivation to avoid costs of not
acting. If inhibitor levels are high, and outweigh
enablers, it is predicted that people will avoid
the negative arousal by avoiding or cognitively
reframing the situation. In the remaining two
combinations (high-high or low-low) perceivers
may reframe the situation, or seek indirect in-
tervention (high-high contexts) or produce vari-
able behavior (low-low). Given individuals ten-
dency to be risk aversive in uncertain situations
(e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001), it is predicted that when enablers
and inhibitors are at similar levels, caution will
prevail and people will be less likely to act
directly.
Although the model was originally intended
to address helping behavior, here we cast it in
terms of behavior to deal with group dissent.
Modeling enablers and inhibitors in the context
of intragroup processes makes relatively clear
predictions for situations when there is an in-
group deviant. We contend that arousal is gen-
erated by the potential disruption to in-group
norms posed by the deviant (cf. Blascovich &
Tomaka, 1996). This disruption potentially af-
fects positive social identity and causes cogni-
tive dissonance between how the group ought to
be perceived, and how it is in actuality (cf.
Festinger, 1957). Given deviants invoke
arousal, group members’ decisions on whether,
and how, to respond should then reflect the
presence of inhibitors and enablers in line with
the A:CR model. In this context, inhibitors
could include the experience of negative inter-
personal interaction, the effort and energy in-
volved in the interaction, potential retaliation
from the deviant and losing the opportunity for
interaction with other group members. In con-
trast, enablers in such a situation could include
the motivation to sustain positive social iden-
tity, preventing contagion of the deviant’s be-
havior to other group members (cf. Wellen &
Neale, 2006) and potential support from norma-
tive group members.
The present study investigates this deci-
sion-making process by presenting group
members with an in-group deviant in the con-
text of an online intergroup decision making
task. Participants then indicate their behav-
ioral action tendencies and communicate with
other in-group members (allowing observa-
tion of actual behaviors). We investigate the
role of two enablers. These are the impor-
tance of the group norm and normative action
support (cf. Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Mar-
tinez-Taboada, 1998; van Zomeren, Spears,
Fischer, & Leach, 2004). We also investigate
the impact of an inhibitor, the potential cost asso-
ciated with interaction (cf. Kerr & Levine, 2007).
Importance
Group norms vary in the degree to which they
are perceived as important to the group’s iden-
tity. Therefore, a relevant enabler may be each
group member’s own level of motivation to
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defend the group’s position regarding particular
norms. A norm that is more important is worth
defending more strongly because violations of
important norms have greater potential to dam-
age the group’s positive distinctiveness from
relevant out-groups that do not share the norm.
For instance, when valued aspects of identities
are threatened, group members use more ag-
gressive language toward sources of threat,
allocate lower rewards and attribute more neg-
ative traits (e.g., Aquino & Douglas, 2003; Biz-
man & Yinon, 2001). Similarly, Marques,
Abrams, Paez, and Martinez-Taboada (1998)
manipulated the salience of prescriptive nature
of norms violated by deviants. Marques et al.
(1998) observed that when prescriptive norm
salience was high (which should lead to higher
mean norm importance among participants),
group members derogated in-group deviants
more strongly. We expect higher subjective im-
portance of the in-group norm should act as
enabler in terms of the A:CR model, because
violations of important norms lead to higher
costs for failing to act.
Normative Support
We define normative support as encourage-
ment from group members (achieved through a
sense of collective action and a defrayment of
risk) combined with the creation of normative
pressures to persuade deviants being generated
by the group and transmitted to individual
group members. Two previous studies (Abrams,
Rutland, Cameron & Ferrell, 2007; Marques et
al., 1998, Experiment 3) have shown that im-
plicit normative pressure, via accountability to
the in-group, resulted in greater defense of in-
group norms when participants evaluated devi-
ants. In the present study, normative support is
operationalized more directly by varying
whether participants believed other in-group
members had chosen to contact the deviant.
Such normative support should decrease the
perceived cost of persuading, while increasing
the cost of failing to persuade. Consensus
among group members provides a sense that
members’ behavior and attitudes are valid and
correct, reducing uncertainty (Abrams & Hogg,
1990; Marques et al., 2001). When situations
are ambiguous or when several courses of ac-
tion may appear appropriate the behavior of
other group members provides clear cues as to
the best course of action (Festinger, 1957;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987).
As well as providing guidance as to how to
behave, sharing the burden of action also re-
duces the risk of retaliation by the deviant to-
ward any particular member, thereby reducing
each member’s vulnerability (e.g., Horne &
Cutlip, 2002). For instance, group members are
more willing to engage in collective action
when other group members appear willing to
engage in such actions alongside them, and po-
tentially risky cooperation is more likely when
group members agree verbally to cooperate be-
forehand (cf. Chen & Komorita, 1994; van
Zomeren et al., 2004). Normative support may
also increase the costs of not attempting to
persuade. Research into social influence sug-
gests group members are usually highly aware
of behavioral and attitudinal in-group norms
that develop in ongoing situations and strive to
conform to them (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell,
Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Asch, 1951;
Crandall, O’Brien, & Eshleman, 2002). Know-
ing other normative group members have at-
tempted to engage with deviants can create a
metanorm of actively approaching deviants
(Horne & Cutlip, 2002; Schachter, 1951). A
member who fails to adhere to this emergent
norm could themselves risk being labeled as a
“second order” deviant, something group mem-
bers are usually aware of (see Ostrom, 1996).
Thus, normative support is also expected to act
as an enabler, increasing the likelihood of per-
suasive action by both decreasing the potential
cost of attempting to persuade the deviant, and
simultaneously increasing the potential cost of
failing to attempt to persuade the deviant.
Potential Cost of Intervention
Enablers may be countered by variables that
raise the potential cost of intervening. In by-
stander studies cost has often been operational-
ized by how much inconvenience would be
caused by intervening, or the degree of risk
apparently involved. Increased costs reduce
helping interventions (see Darley & Batson,
1973; Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972; Ungar, 1979).
A variety of potential costs may be associated
with communicating with deviant in-group
members. A deviant’s behavior is likely to be
seen as less predictable than that of normative
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members. In particular, attempts to change the
deviant’s opinion may invite retaliation. Such
retaliation may include personal and negative
communication from the deviant to would-be
persuaders for a prolonged period. Such stress-
ful conflict can lead to negative affect such as
anxiety, depression, frustration or fear (Bolger,
DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989; Frone,
2000; Spector & Jex, 1998). Interpersonal con-
flict can also escalate to include physical and
psychological harassment (e.g., Winstock,
Eisikovits, & Fishman, 2004).
These potential repercussions are present
only if the deviant is able to identify and re-
spond to the actor. In such situations retaliation
can be more specifically directed at the per-
suader, and potentially be longer in duration.
Thus, costs to the member are potentially higher
when they are identifiable by the deviant than
when they are anonymous. Previous research
has not investigated whether the potential for
direct, accountable, personal engagement with
the deviant might inhibit persuasion. However,
several studies suggest that increased identifi-
ablity increases concerns about the repercussion
of actions and inhibits behavior. For instance,
group members are more critical of others when
anonymous, and can be more aggressive (Rog-
ers & Ketchen, 1979; Stone, Spool, & Rabinow-
itz, 1977). Thus, it is predicted that if the devi-
ant is able to identify the persuader this should
act as an inhibitor of persuasion as it increases
the potential cost of intervening.
Behavioral Outcomes
Our study investigates both persuasion action
tendency and actual occurrence of communica-
tive acts. To test the effects of importance,
normative support, and identifiability, we focus
on whether or not group members choose to
communicate with the deviant, and the propor-
tion of messages that are actively persuasive
versus passive. Persuasive communications are
characterized by task-orientated focus that out-
lines the reason(s) that the persuader’s point of
view is correct. These can be based on rational
arguments (central processing) or by activating
cognitive shortcuts (heuristic processing; see
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).
Direct persuasion may encourage recrimina-
tion from the deviant, but also increases the
probability that the deviant will become norma-
tive, thereby protecting the group identity and
hence the self (Tajfel, 1974). An alternative
goal of communication might be information
seeking, perhaps to understand the deviant’s
reasons or what type of person the deviant is.
Such inquiries might also reduce the deviant’s
certainty but they are coded as passive as there
is no clear goal of persuading the deviant. Fi-
nally, instead of contacting the deviant directly,
group members may communicate with a nor-
mative member or decide not to send a message
at all. For the purposes of the present research,
these responses (including empty and nonsense
messages) are classed as noncontact with the
deviant.
Following the A:CR model, it is predicted
that the likelihood and character of communi-
cation with deviants will depend on how differ-
ent potential enablers and inhibitors combine in
a particular context. Overall, we expect a three-
way interaction between cost, importance, and
normative support. Specifically, some contexts
will be enabling. These are when enablers out-
weigh inhibitors. Perceived cost must be low
and either the importance of the issue or nor-
mative support must be high (so at least one
motivates communication), or alternatively, if
cost is high then both importance and normative
support must be high. Other contexts will be
inhibiting (when inhibitors outweigh or equal
enablers. These are when cost is high and either
importance or support is low, or alternatively,
when cost, importance and support are all low).
Consequently, the form of the interaction
should be one in which there is a higher level of
persuasive communication in the enabling con-
texts than in the inhibiting contexts.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited online from various
United Kingdom universities’ mailing lists and
online forums aimed at British users (N 115; 50
male, 63 female, and 2 did not report gender).
Ages ranged from 18 to 38 years (M  21.31,
SD  3.11). All participants reported their oc-
cupation as “student,” and 90% used a univer-
sity e-mail address. Recruitment invitations
were posted for 2 days (data collection lasted 3




A 2 (Potential Cost: Higher vs. Lower)  2
(Normative Support: Higher vs. Lower) be-
tween-participants design was used. Importance
of the norm was included as a quasi-indepen-
dent variable. The dependent variables were
persuasion action tendency, choice of message
recipient, and the content of the message. Ma-
nipulation checks consisted of in-group favor-
ability and perceived typicality of the deviant’s
attitude.
Procedure
Data were collected using an online question-
naire. Participants could only commence the
study once they had indicated they had read and
understood their rights, and that they were
over 18 years old.
Following paradigms from previous research
(e.g., Marques et al., 1998), the first screen
ostensibly tested whether participants were ei-
ther “creative” or “methodological” thinkers by
asking four questions (e.g., Do you make deci-
sions quickly or slowly?) and asking partici-
pants twice which of two similar images they
preferred from two pairs of pictures. In reality,
participants randomly received feedback that
they were either “methodological” or “creative”
thinkers and were to be assigned to a group of
such thinkers (this assignment had no effect on
the results). They read a brief description of the
two groups, highlighting the advantages of the
in-group over the out-group (e.g., “Methodolog-
ical thinkers are efficient and are more likely to
come up with practical solutions in complex
situations. Methodological thinkers have an eye
for detail. Creative thinkers are good at looking
at problems in a new light but they are some-
times impractical”).
Participants read two arguments in favor of,
and two opposing, the proposal that the United
Kingdom should adopt the Euro rather than the
Pound as its currency (an issue of topical im-
portance at the time). Participants were told
they would be placed in small discussion groups
of people with the same thinking style, and
would be required to come to a group decision
as to whether they supported or were against the
proposal. It was stressed in the text that the
discussion group’s decision would only be re-
corded if a unanimous decision was reached.
This methodology was adopted to ensure the
deviant’s behavior had actual ramifications for
the discussion group and, in turn, the public
image of their type of thinking group as a
whole. At this point participants’ verdicts and
the importance they attached to the issue were
measured.
The next screen established the in-group and
out-group norms, creating an intergroup context
to ensure that participants understood that the
deviant in-group member posed a threat to the
salient in-group norm. An empty table was dis-
played that was gradually populated with infor-
mation about the opinions of a discussion group
comprising five in-group members, including
the participant. The table highlighted the name
of the thinking group and the opinions of each
of the members. Remaining in-group members
were identified by a participant number. Based
in reality on participant’s own attitude position,
but ostensibly only on their group membership,
all in-group members apart from the deviant
(identified as participant #130) stated the same
attitudinal position as the participant, thus en-
suring this was normative. The screen simulta-
neously showed a separate table depicting an
equal number of out-group members. This was
displayed in a different colored font, and
showed all out-group members disagreeing with
in-group’s normative position. The deviant in-
group member also agreed with the out-group
rather than the in-group norm.
Potential cost and normative support were
manipulated at this point. Higher versus lower
potential cost was manipulated by stating: “If
you send a message, the person who receives it
[will/will not] know which participant sent it
and [will, for the next two weeks/will not] be
able to send you a message.” Thus, in the higher
cost condition, contacting the deviant ostensibly
created the potential for both identification and
unwanted reciprocal contact for two weeks. In
the lower cost condition the deviant would not
know which participant sent the message, and
the participant could not be contacted after the
study had been completed.
Higher versus lower normative support was
manipulated by stating: “So far three people
have decided they [will/will not] contact partic-
ipant #130 and two have yet to decide who to
contact.” Hence, in the higher support condition
the normative group members all indicated that
they would contact the deviant, while the devi-
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ant and the participant had yet to decide. In the
lower support condition none of the normative
members intended to contact the deviant, rather
they contacted another normative member.
After reading the manipulations participants
completed the persuasion action tendency scale
(see below). A new screen invited participants
to write a short message to the group member of
their choice. Finally, participants completed
manipulation checks before being given a brief
explanation of the study. These checks were
included last to ensure the aims of the study
were not revealed prematurely. Full debriefing
followed a short while later via e-mail.
Materials
Importance. Participants were asked “How
important to you is the issue of entry into the
Euro?” (1  Very unimportant, 7  Very im-
portant).
Group favorability. Group favorability was
measured by asking participants how much they
agreed with the same two items for the in-group
and out-group; “I feel favorable toward [in-
group/out-group] thinkers as a group” and “[in-
group/out-group] thinkers are good at solving
problems” (1  Not at all agree, 7  Very
much agree). In-group favorability was mea-
sured first (Cronbach’s   .71), followed by
out-group favorability (Cronbach’s   .69).
In-group bias was calculated by subtracting
out-group favorability from in-group favorabil-
ity. Positive scores indicated a preference for
the in-group.
Deviant’s perceived attitude. Divergence of
the deviant member’s attitude relative to the
in-group was measured using the question
“How typical of (in-group) thinkers was partic-
ipant #130’s attitude toward joining the Euro”
(1  Not at all typical, 7  Very typical).
Persuasion action tendency. Persuasion ac-
tion tendency toward the deviant in-group
member was measured using three items, all
measured on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much)
scale. Participants were asked “How much does
thinking about participant #130 make you want
to:” followed by three behaviors: “try and in-
fluence him/her,” “confront him/her,” and “per-
suade him/her.” Scale reliability was good




Group favorability. Repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the group
favorability items confirmed the meaningful-
ness of the group membership manipulation.
Participants evaluated the in-group more favor-
ably (M  5.01, SD  1.31) than the out-group
(M  3.74, SD  1.30), F(1, 114)  46.58, p 
.001, 2  .29.
Deviant’s attitude. A one-sample t test was
used to check that the deviant’s attitude was
perceived as atypical of the in-group. The mean
score for this item was 2.76 (SD  1.72), sig-
nificantly lower than the midpoint of the scale
(4), t(114)  7.73, p  .001.
Persuasion Action Tendency
Because two of the independent variables
were categorical and because we had specific
predictions about particular combinations of
conditions, the three way interaction was ex-
plored using ANOVA with a median split on
Importance.1 This revealed a significant effect
of Support, F(1, 106) 5.24, p .02, 2  .05.
Persuasion action tendency was higher in the
higher support condition (M  3.48, SD  1.70)
than the lower support condition (M  3.02,
SD  1.60). The main effect of Importance was
also significant, F(1, 106)  6.68, p  .011,
2  .06. Persuasion action tendency was
higher when the issue was considered more
important (M  3.53, SD  1.47) relative to
when it was of lower importance (M  2.73,
SD  1.46). The main effect of Cost and all two
way interactions were nonsignificant, Fs 
.167, ps  .20, 2s  .02. However, the pre-
dicted three-way interaction was significant,
F(1, 106)  13.07, p  .001, 2  .11. Means
are shown in Figure 1.
To test the hypotheses regarding levels of
persuasion action tendency we contrasted the
enabling contexts (specifically the high cost,
1 The data were initially analyzed using hierarchical mul-
tiple regression with Cost and Support as binary variables
and Importance (centered) as a continuous variable. The
significant effects are the same as those reported for the
ANOVA, including the three-way interaction,   1.44,
t(106) 3.76, p .001, overall R2  .22, F(7, 106) 4.15,
p  .001.
85PERSUADING IN-GROUP DEVIANTS
high importance, high support condition, and
also the three low cost conditions in which
either support or importance were high) versus
inhibiting contexts (where costs were high and
either importance or support were low, and also
the low cost, low importance and low support
condition). This contrast revealed a significant
effect on persuasion action tendency, F(1,
112)  23.68, p  .001, 2  .18. Persuasion
action tendency was lower in the inhibiting con-
texts (M  2.56, SD  1.41) than the enabling
contexts (M  3.82, SD  1.34).
Message Target and Content
Messages sent by participants were coded by
two raters blind to the experimental condition
and hypotheses. Messages were classed either
as aiming to persuade (e.g., “We should join the
Euro before the pound completely devalues and
things start to get more expensive”), as inquiries
(“Why do you think we should join the Euro?”)
or other communications, including messages
sent to the deviant with no inquiring or persua-
sive intent, communications to the normative
member, or instances when no message sent.
Failure to send a message to the deviant was
considered the same as other types of nonper-
suasive/inquiring communication because both
constitute a lack of active engagement with the
deviant.
Interrater reliability was calculated for the
messages (Landis & Koch, 1977) and was ac-
ceptable (Cohen’s   .71). Overall, more par-
ticipants sent persuasive or inquiring if they
attached higher importance to the issue than if
they attached lower importance (messages to
the deviant, n  79) than did not (n  36), 	2(1
df, N  115)  8.04, p  .001. Table 1 shows
the number of persuasive and inquiring mes-
sages sent to the deviant as a function of inde-
pendent variables, with chi square tests showing
whether the proportions of persuasive versus
inquiring versus nonmessage to the deviant var-
ied as a function of condition. We followed
these with single degree of freedom tests for
specific types of communication.
Persuasion messages to the deviant. More
persuasion messages were sent in the lower cost
condition than the higher cost condition, 	2(1
df, N  115)  9.06, p  .003. Moreover,
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Figure 1. Persuasion action tendency as a function of potential cost, perceived importance,
and normative support. Means are shown with their corresponding standard deviations (in
parentheses).
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messages 	2(1 df, N  114)  14.5, p  .001.
Levels of support did not affect the number of
persuasive messages, 	2(1 df, N  115)  1.31,
p  .251. To test whether more persuasive
messages were sent in enabling contexts relative
to inhibiting contexts, frequency of persuasive
messages was analyzed according to context.
The proportion of persuasive messages was
higher in the enabled contexts (33%) than in
inhibited contexts (13%), 	2(1 df, N 
115)  6.11, p  .013.
Inquiring messages to the deviant. None of
the independent variables affected the propor-
tion of inquiring messages to the deviant, 	2 (1
df) 1.20, ps .27), nor was there a difference
between the enabled and inhibited contexts,
	2(1 df, N  115)  0.96, p  .23.
Communication length. Messages with out-
lying lengths (over 255 characters) were trun-
cated to 255. Prior to analysis all spaces were
stripped from the text of the messages, to dis-
count double spacing and carriage returns. Par-
ticipants who did not send a message were
excluded from this analysis. Message content
was significantly related to message length, F(2,
97)  30.93, p  .001, 2  .39. The mean
number of characters contained in messages was
higher in persuasive messages (M  151.96,
SD  58.91) than in inquiring messages
(M 95.09, SD 52.26 p .001) or in messages
sent to the normative target, (M  56.27,
SD  45.66, p  .004).2 Experimental condi-
tions had no effect upon message length,
Fs  2.56, ps .11. Finally, we examined the
bivariate relationship between persuasion action
tendency and whether or not participants actu-
ally delivered a persuasive message, and the
relation between these variables and enabling
versus inhibiting contexts. Persuasion action
tendency was significantly related to the propor-
tion of persuasive messages (r .20, p .032).
Levels of persuasion action tendency were
higher in the enabling contexts (r  .40, p 
.001), as was the incidence of actual persuasion
(r  .23, p  .013).
Discussion
Evidence shows that deviants pose a chal-
lenge to in-group norms and identity (e.g.,
Hutchison et al., 2008) and that when identity is
insecure people may want to evict the deviant
from the group (Eidelman et al., 2006), or fence
the deviant off (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Pal-
adino, & Leemans, 2001). Furthermore, there
are strong theoretical reasons why people may
want to retain deviants within the group but
persuade them to change their position. These
include preservation of a “valid” consensus,
preservation of the group as an entity, and con-
firmation of the validity of categorization of
people as group members (Abrams & Christian,
2007; Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison,
& Viki, 2005; Marques et al., 2001). Previous
research has not identified conditions under
which members try to persuade an in-group
deviant. This research utilizes the A:CR model
to predict about the conditions that would foster
persuasion action tendency, and indeed moti-
vate actual efforts at persuasion. As predicted,
enablers (high norm importance and high levels
2 An identical analysis including participants who did not
send messages (e.g., had a message length of zero) showed
an identical pattern of results, F(2, 112)  41.24, p  .001,
2  .42.
Table 1
Number of Persuasion and Inquiry Messages Sent to the Deviant as a Function of Cost, Support, and
Importance
n (%)
	2 (2 df) pPersuade Inquiring No message
Higher cost 6 (11.32) 29 (54.72) 18 (33.96) 9.46 .009
Lower cost 22 (35.48) 22 (35.48) 18 (29.03)
Higher support 11 (19.64) 28 (50) 17 (30.36) 1.81 .40
Lower support 17 (28.81) 23 (38.98) 19 (32.20)
Higher importance 23 (39.66) 20 (34.48) 15 (25.86) 14.60 .001
Lower importance 5 (8.93) 31 (55.36) 20 (35.71)
Note. Percentages are calculated separately for each row.
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of normative support) and inhibitors (high po-
tential cost) interactively affected both persua-
sion action tendency and behavior. Specifically,
when potential costs were higher, subjective
importance and normative support both had to
be higher before group members would express
persuasion action tendency. Furthermore, when
costs were lower, the presence of either high
subjective importance or higher normative sup-
port was sufficient to motivate action tendency.
Previous research has rarely examined be-
havioral responses to deviants. The present
study measured the amount and form of com-
munication directed at the deviant. Consistent
with both the persuasion action tendencies and
our hypotheses, participants directed communi-
cation at the deviant much more than elsewhere.
Moreover, the content of that communication
was more likely to be persuasion (rather than
inquiry or other) when the importance of the
issue was high and the cost was low. Moreover,
these persuasion communications were more
extended than other messages, suggesting in-
creased levels of effort.
Comparing communication in the cells of the
design that should produce higher persuasion
intentions (i.e., enabling contexts) with the re-
maining cells (inhibiting contexts), showed
clear support for idea that conditions that pro-
mote persuasion action tendency also promotes
actual persuasion behavior. This both confirms
inferences made by existing empirical studies
and also provides important insights for future
research.
As well as extending the applications of the
A:CR model, this research complements exist-
ing research into in-group deviance which tests
conditions under which group members choose
to distance themselves from groups when devi-
ants are present (e.g., Eidelman & Biernat,
2003; Eidelman et al., 2006). Our research sug-
gests that in costly situations, if the issue is of
low subjective importance or when there is low
normative support for action, group members
may be less likely to expend effort to defend
in-group norms. This evidence also has impli-
cations for a variety of well-established theories
that concern how individuals choose to ap-
proach a goal. These include regulatory focus
theory (Higgins, 1997), power inhibition theory
(Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), the
bio-psychosocial model of challenge and threat
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) and the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). Our findings
suggest that changes in factors such as social
support can be effective predictors of behavioral
intentions in one context (e.g., when the group
member perceived low costs and the issue as
important) but not in another (e.g., when costs
perceived higher and the issue as unimportant).
The evidence suggests that such theoretical ap-
proaches are relevant for explaining the way
groups deal with deviant members, and also
shows that both action tendencies and behavior
are affected by theoretically relevant variables.
Action tendencies and behavior were signif-
icantly but not very strongly related, suggesting
that there are additional independent influences
on these two variables. For example, it seems
plausible that costs loom larger when people are
faced with an opportunity for action (e.g., to
communicate with the deviant). This highlights
the need to explore how group members’ per-
ceptions of the resources available to them in
such situations combine with the subjective im-
portance of the task at hand in determining their
promotion/prevention or challenge/threat orien-
tation.
The present research also raises new ques-
tions for the literature into minority influence
(e.g., Martin, Gardikiotis, & Hewstone, 2002;
Moscovici & Mugny, 1983). Minorities are
similar to deviants in that they hold counternor-
mative attitudes. The present findings suggest
minority views are most likely to be directly
challenged in situations where enablers out-
weigh inhibitors. Applying the A:CR model to
minority influence could lead to predictions that
minority group members may be most influen-
tial in contexts where high levels of inhibitors
are present, to the extent that such contexts
encourage cognitive reframing, which could in-
clude accepting the minority view. However,
such contexts may also lead to increased stig-
matization and ostracism, both of which strate-
gies may serve as symbolic marginalization of
minority group members which could reduce
arousal (e.g., Marques et al., 2001).
Although our research provides important
new evidence regarding responses to in-group
deviants, we acknowledge that only one form of
behavior was examined (i.e., communicative
action). While many of these communications
took the form of persuasion, it is possible that
other responses might arise in different circum-
stances. Further experimental research should
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consider additional conditions that determine
whether people choose active sanctioning or
excluding deviants from the group as an alter-
native to persuasion.
Given the role of normative support, further
research should also investigate how account-
ability to other group members combines with
normative support to either facilitate or inhibit
different action tendencies. Previous research
has demonstrated that accountability to in-
group members elevates both in-group confor-
mity (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990) and derogation
of deviants (Abrams et al., 2007; Elder, Sutton,
& Douglas, 2005; Marques et al., 1998), and
other research suggests that the power position
of the deviant (e.g., leader vs. member) also
moderates derogation of deviants (Abrams,
Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison,
2008).
Future research could also focus predictions
made by the A:CR model regarding responses
which are more likely to occur when enablers
and inhibitors are in relative equilibrium. One
interesting possibility is that when enablers are
high (e.g., addressing deviance is a priority) but
the probability of action is offset by inhibitors,
group members attempt to cope with deviance
by encouraging other group members to address
the deviant’s behavior (i.e., indirect action).
This encouragement could, in turn, present
higher levels of enablers to subsequent group
members cost calculations. The present research
suggests that prior and anticipated behavior of
the deviant is also likely to alter whether pun-
ishment or persuasion is the preferred course of
action.
A caveat to our present conclusions is that the
impact of normative support, importance and
potential cost may differ depending on the ex-
tent to which they act as enablers or inhibitors in
differing contexts. For instance, within collec-
tive societies or groups social support may act
as a stronger enabler than in individualistic ones
(see Triandis, 1995).
A final limitation is the use of online, rather
than face-to-face groups. Online communica-
tion may be somewhat more distant and task
focused than face-to-face interaction, although
due to deindividuation some group members
may be more expressive online than face-to-
face (e.g., Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimmons,
2002). However, there is increased use of social
profile Web sites that rely upon message ex-
changes in a form similar to that of the present
study (e.g., MySpace, Facebook), and comput-
er-mediated communication is often used by
groups that also have a face-to-face existence to
facilitate communication. These blur the bound-
aries between online and offline communica-
tion. Although the content of online communica-
tions may differ in extremity from face-to-face
communication, it seems likely that persuasion is
likely to rise and fall according to changes in
importance, cost, and normative support inde-
pendently of whether the group is meeting face-
to-face or online.
In conclusion, using the A:CR approach this
study has created a bridge between Schachter’s
(1951) early work and more contemporary the-
ory on social identity, demonstrating persuasive
responses to deviants are predictable from a
combination of both enabling and inhibiting
variables, defined in terms of the potential costs
of action. In addition, this is one of the few
studies to have tested behavioral responses to
deviants and showing that these behavioral re-
sponses are partially independent of attitudinal
expressions. When action has a lower potential
cost, raising level of either the internal or ex-
ternal factors seems sufficient to motivate per-
suasion action tendency. When action carries a
higher potential cost, it is necessary that both
the internal and external factors support action.
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